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A REAL OPTIONS APPLICATION TO THE
FISHING VESSEL SCRAPPING DECISION
OF VESSEL BUYBACK PROGRAMS
Yao-Hsien Lee*, Tsung-Tai Yang**, and Ching-Ta Chuang***
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ABSTRACT
This paper adopts the real options approach to examine vessel
owners behavior in deciding whether to participate or not in the vessel
buyback programs. The model allows us to investigate profit uncertainty in a decision to retire an aged vessel and the underlying value
of waiting for new information about the profitability of such a
change, which may affect the willingness of vessel owners to participate in the vessel buyback programs. Our analysis shows that the
government needs to pay more attention to profit uncertainty, which
may invalidate the vessel buyback program that does not take it into
account. This also contributes to explain the failure of most of the
vessel buyback programs aimed at encouraging the retirement of aged
vessels in Taiwan. We also evaluate the value of willingness to accept
of vessel owners and its policy implications are discussed.

INTRODUCTION
Overcapitalization and overcapacity in the fisheries have been found in recent years. Mace (1997) points
out in her address in the World Conference on Fisheries
that as much as 70% of world’s fisheries are in different
degrees of stress (fully exploited, over exploited, or in
recovery). Concerning with this fact and its impacts on
fish stocks has reported in the literature (FAO, 1997).
In Taiwan, the prohibition policy of building new fishing vessels without quota has been enacted. By 1990
there were 4,824 powered fishing vessels operated more
than 15 years, which represent 35% of the total vessels.
Because of low efficiency and diminished revenue in
Taiwan’s offshore fisheries, the smuggling activities
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have caused fisheries management and society security
problems. In order to improve and stabilize this
phenomenon, Fisheries administration authorities has
implemented the vessel buyback program for 5 years
from 1991 to 1995. Under this program, purchase of 2,
337 vessels has granted at NT$12,000 per ton for each
vessel. However, the purchased vessels can hardly
reach the expected buyback goal of 10,000 powered
fishing vessels. This is due to the fact that vessel owners
are unwilling to retire those aged fishing vessel
automatically, which makes the goal of the program
difficult to achieve (Dai, 1997).
Our goal in this paper is to investigate the decision
of fishing vessel owners to retire the aged vessels in the
presence of profit uncertainty. We accomplish this by
using the real options approach to analyze under profit
uncertainty how vessel owners are willingly to give up
aged vessels. In the paper, the main source of profit
uncertainty comes from vessel owners’ shortage of full
information about evaluating the future state of fish
stocks and fish prices. Another source is that vessel
owners may obtain political windfall due to the industrial characteristics of fishery in Taiwan. We explain
why the effect of vessel buyback program was not
significant. The program purchased, for example, only
96 vessels representing 0.72% of total number of vessels in 1995.
In related literature, Holland, Gudmundsson, and
Gates (1999) concluded that buyback programs are
generally not an effective way to solve the problems of
too many vessels and too much fishing power. They do
not explain the reason why buyback programs are unsuccessful from the theoretical viewpoint. Li (1998)
uses the model of option value to analyze the case,
where the mutual cooperated fishing proprietors will
become more conservative in their fishing actions in
order to elevate their efficiency in fishing under the
uncertainty of fishing resources stock with no another
fishing fleets entering into the fishing ground. Chuang
(1999) introduces a discontinuous choice model to evaluate the buyback program of Taiwanese fishing fleets,
pointing out that the goal of buyback program can be
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achieved effectively by considering both economic conditions and the fishing vessel value. Sun (1998) shows
that neither the program to restrict the building of new
vessels nor a combination of this program with the
vessel retirement and buyback program is enough to
avoid overfishing for Taiwan’s offshore fisheries. She
concludes that a passive vessel retirement and buyback
program in Taiwan’s offshore fisheries is not an effective resource stock recovery program. Moretto (2000)
applies a real options model to analyze the vehiclescrapping programs aimed at encouraged the retirement
of old cars. Considering stochastic net benefits of
driving service, vehicle owners would wait for the net
benefit information, which may substantially affect the
scrapping time.
This paper follows the real options approach which
has been developed by Dixit (1993), Dixit and Pindyck
(1994), Trigeorgis (1999), and Moretto (2000), to set up
a stochastic vessel owner’s decision model. This model
can be use to account for the effect of vessel buyback
programs which affect the retirement policy of vessel
owners by considering the uncertainty of waiting value.
By our setting, the paper can determine a vessel owner’s
willingness-to-accept (WTA) price for a vessel buyback
program by the numerical method. The results explain
the reason why vessel buyback programs in Taiwan
cannot be accomplished effectively. The main explanation for the failure of vessel buyback programs is because the uncertain fishing net profit causes the waiting
value which makes vessel owners postpone their willingness of retiring aged vessels.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2
discusses and reviews the experience of vessel buyback
programs in Taiwan. In this section we provide a
description of the problem of fisheries management and
the implementation of vessel buyback programs. Section 3 develops a stochastic model of retirement aged
vessels. An analysis of the retirement decision for
vessel owners is derived in this section. Section 4
presents some numerical simulation analysis in support
of our conclusions. Section 5 concludes with a brief
summary.
VESSEL BUYBACK PROGRAMS IN TAIWAN
The government of Taiwan has invested heavily in
the fishing industry to boost its commercial fishing fleet
since the 1950s 1. In Figure 1 we use four indices to
represent fishing industry capacity including number of
boats, tonnage, horse power, and total landing. Using
1970 as the base year, the index numbers are the ratio of
the quantity of each measure for a year to that of the
based year, respectively. Technological improvements
in engine design cause the total horse power to rise
sharply. The discrepancy in growth rates between number of vessels and vessel tonnage implies that large steel
vessels have replaced wooden vessels in recent years.
The promotive policy adopted by the Taiwan government has greatly increased fish harvest till the late 70s.
The recent trend in harvest seems to suggest that the
growth of the fishing industry has exerted pressure on
fish stocks.
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Fig. 1. Capacity growth of taiwan fishing industry [6].
1

Low interest loans were provided to fishermen for upgrading vessels and procuring equipment. A substantial fuel subsidy was implemented to cut operating
costs and increase profits. These measures have increased the industrial capacity.
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In response to the decline in the profit of fishing
operations, in 1991, 3 billion NT dollars was appropriated to implement a five-year (1991-1995) buyback
program in an effort to reverse the trend of excessive
capitalization and growth2. The program was designed
to achieve multiple purposes besides reducing fishing
capacity and protecting fishing resources. First, the
fluctuation in profits had leaded fishing vessel owners
to do smuggling and other illegal activities, which were
expected to be curtailed by the program. Second, the
buyback program in its second year targeted high seas
drift net vessels to comply with the UN resolution that
banns their uses 3. Third, the buyback program was
expected to accelerate the retirement of old vessels for
reducing vessel site congestion and to enhance the
amenities in fishing harbors.
The buyback program was publicized each year
for a period of twenty days for the first year and thirty
days thereafter to keep the fishermen informed. Applicants were required to register at the fishery department
of the local county government. Application was then
submitted to the Council of Agriculture for approval.
However, no historical catch records or revenues were
used for screening or evaluating the applicants. The
approved vessels along with their licenses were turned
over to the local government. The purchased vessels
were then scrapped in a way that those were burned and
those made of steel or FRP were submerged to the sea to
form artificial reefs. Figure 2 shows details of operational procedures for the buyback program.
Different criteria were applied to target specific
types of vessels. For 1991-1992, all vessels were eligible for the program as long as the owner had a legal
fishing license. In 1993, only vessels at least 15 years
old could apply for the program. In 1994, vessel age for

eligibility was lowered to 12 years due to low participation in the program. In addition to eligibility criteria,
priorities were also set for different ages and types. In
1991, vessels older than 20 years were given the highest
priority. Older drift-net boats were given higher priorities next year to comply with the UN resolution banning
their uses. In 1993, priorities were assigned to assure
that active vessels were bought back. Captains with
licenses that had expired before Nov. 17, 1990 were
assigned the third priority if they agreed to not engage
in fishing activities anymore. Similar schemes were
also adopted in 1994.
Applicants in vessel buyback programs are usually
voluntary. They evaluate the total benefits offered by
the program and choose to give up a vessel and fishing
license as they see fit. The opportunity cost of retiring
the vessel is simply the profit that could have been
realized if the vessel continues its fishing operation.
For a rational applicant, the comparison of the opportunity cost and the program benefits determines the decision for submitting an application. If the buyback offer
is greater than the profit that a vessel can generate over
the remainder of its life, the vessel owner will forgo the
vessel and participate in the program, and vice versa.
In reality, an effective vessel buyback program
needs careful design and implementation. Vessel
buyback programs in Taiwan were well funded and the
programs had been revised and improved during its
five-year run. In this study, we have surveyed the
economic incentives for vessel owners to apply the
vessel buyback program. Among the 108 full-time
vessel owners who engage in commercial and recreational fisheries, only 25 of the response think that the
buyback scheme is reasonable. Referring to Table 1, the
minimal acceptable price for participating in the vessel

Background Verification

Public Notice of Reclaim
1. 20 days for 1991
2. One month between
1992-1995

Return Vessel and
Collect Compensation
Related proof of document

135

Registration

Process Aged Vessels

1. Picture attachment of vessel body
2. Registration listing
3. Approval from Council of Agriculture

Forward Record and
Detail List of Buyback to
Council of Agriculture

Fig. 2. Operational procedures of the vessel buyback program.
2

Taiwan government issued a directive at the 6th National Security Convention held on October 8th, 1990 to control the number of vessels through a buyback
program.
3
In order to comply with international fishery protection activities, gill net of large mesh size and squid gill net have been forbidden in Taiwan since 1993.
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Table 1. Respondent’s feedback on the buyback program and intention to participate

Tonnage

Is NT$12,000

of
Vessel

Per Ton
Reasonable

0- 5
5-10
10-20
20-50
Total

Acceptable Increntive for

Participant

Participation in the Buyback Program
Net Fishery
Line Fishery

in the
Buyback
Program

Yes

No

Total

Min.
(NT$)

Max.
(NT$)

Ave.
(NT$)

Min.
(NT$)

Max.
(NT$)

Ave.
(NT$)

4
11
6
4
25

16
24
28
15
83

20
35
34
19
108

10,000
16,000
15,000
12,000
10,000

25,000
35,000
40,000
30,000
40,000

16,750
21,750
25,000
19,500
21,750

12,000
18,000
16,000
16,500
12,000

28,000
40,000
50,000
25,000
50,000

22,500
26,500
28,500
21,000
24,375

6
10
9
7
32

Source: These surveys were conducted in June and October 1998 respectively.
Note: Net fishery includes trawl net, gill net, purse seine, torch light, and large scale; line fishery includes long line, pole and
lines boote, squid jigging, and troll line.

buyback program is NT$12,000 granted by the
government. Following the introduction of this buyback
program, a market for such vessel trade is created since
the total vessel tonnage is limited and new entry is
prohibited in 1989 unless licenses transfer from old
vessels. The highest price for the line fishery vessel
between 10-20 tonnage is about NT$285,000. Vessels
of this category are sold to the market for recreational
fishing vessels. However, the lowest price for the net
fishery vessel between 0-5 tonnage is about NT$ 16,
750. Vessels of this category are heavily traded in the
market. The overall average acceptable price for applying the vessel buyback program is NT$24,375 which is
well above the NT$12,000 buyback price granted by the
government. But this large difference, in our options,
reflects the fact that vessel owners can do more political
actions or through negotiating with the government to
obtain more compensations for participating in vessel
buyback programs.

cycle is assumed to be infinite, which states that the time
horizon for the vessel owner’s decision is infinite. This
assumption follows the basic assumption in both Li
(1998) and Morreto (2000) that would take the owner’s
aged vessel retirement behavior as the retirement behavior of real asset investment. In fact, Munro (1996)
shows that it would be workable in the practice of
community fisheries co-management system in his
research. Munro’s result provides our paper with a
practical ground to assume that the vessel owners’
vessel-scrapping decision in the specific fishery industry (or in the specific fishing community) can be seen as
if a vessel owner’s vessel-scrapping decision. This
would simplify the model addressed in the paper and
allow us to see how profit uncertainty affects the owner’s
vessel-scrapping decision. As in Moretto (2000), we
model the stochastic fishing profit π following a geometric Brownian motion:
dπ t = µπ tdt + σπtdw t, µ ≤ 0, π 0 = m

(1)

STOCHASTIC MODEL
From the point of view of real options, vessel
owners have the right but no obligation to accept the
buyback option. The decision of vessel owners would
depend on the degree of “deep in the money” of that
option. We assume that in a specific fishing industry,
all of the vessel owners are willing to cooperate to work
out the fishing retirement decision in the industry. The
sense of mutual cooperation will lead to organize the
community fisheries co-management system so that we
are able to take this mutual cooperation behavior as the
one single vessel owner who has purchased vessels for
a suitable operation period, and retire an aged one to
replace the same model of new one. This ownership

where dwt is the increment of a standard Wiener process
(Dixit, 1993); µ is the expected growth rate of the trend
value of stochastic process; σ is the standard deviation
of the fishing profits. Thus, equation (1) indicates that
the fishing profit of a new vessel has been known and
expressed by m. In addition, McDonald and Siege
(1986) has shown that πt is log-normally distributed and
E 0( π t) = me ut. Therefore, the expected fishing profit of
vessel owners declines as the vessel ages due to fishing
environmental factors or market conditions. For
instance, fishing environmental factors (i.e., stock
collapse) cause higher risks in fishing operations and
result in higher operating costs, or the marketing conditions (i.e., fishing labor shortage) lead to increasing
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fishing labor costs and the falling-off fishing cost, those
factors all influence the vessel owners’ net profit π t.
Now, starting at time t, the vessel owner’s fishing
profit will be πt = π and the expected present value of the
stream of fishing profits for the owner will be
∞

F(π ) = E

t

π se – r (s – t) ds – ΣCe – r (s i – t) π t = π
i

(2)
where C is the cost of buying new fishing vessel for the
owner; r is the owner’s discount rate; and s i is the time
when a new vessel is bought and the cost C is paid. We
design a decision rule which states that whenever π t
reaches a lower level of profits b < m, the vessel owner
is not longer optimal to keep the aged vessel. Then πt is
instantaneously shift to m at the cost C. That is, the
vessel owner applies for the vessel buyback program
and retires the eligible aged vessel. The owner’s problem is to select optimally the lower barrier b to maximize the equation (2). The regime we describe will
consist of a bang-bang control analyzed by Clark (1990)
and Dixit (1993). Consequently, the aged vessel retirement decision of the owner can be delayed.
Following Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Dixit
(1993), under the condition of π ∈ [b, ∞), it will obtain
F( π ) through the following second order differential
equation:

1 σ 2π 2F"(π ) + µπ F'(π ) – rF(π ) = – π
2

(3)

with the boundary condition F(∞) = 0, and the general
solution is

F(π ) = G π

β1

+ Dπ

β2

+ π
r–µ

F(b) = F(m) − C, and

F'(b) = 0
The value-matching condition indicates that at the
boundary the owner has the same evaluation for either
to keep an aged vessel or to retire it when he faces the
suitable retirement conditions. The smooth-pasting
condition states that at the boundary it needs to meet the
first order condition of equation (2). Therefore, the
following two equations need to be solved:

D(b

β2

β

– m 2) =

m–b
–C
r–µ

(6)

β2

+ b =0
(7)
r–µ
Since π > 0 , D > 0 is required to satisfy equar–µ
tion (7). Based on this result and the condition of m >
b, we obtain m − C( γ − µ) > b. Assuming , b* = m − C
(r − µ), which is the net value of purchasing a new vessel
under certainty, i.e. the profit minus the opportunity
cost of investment C(r − µ ), it is clear that if the
profit£kof aged vessel reaches the value of b, the vessel
owner will purchase a new one because b* > b. In other
words, under profit uncertainty, whether the vessel
owner wants to purchase a new vessel will depend on the
net profit of the aged vessel if it has reached to the value
of b. Therefore, under profit uncertainty, the owner will
wait for obtaining much more information about the
profit of the aged vessel before he decides to purchase
a new one.
Obviously, the waiting value is
D β 2b

W = b* − b = m − C(r − µ) − b.
That is, the waiting value for vessel owners comes
from the parameter value in the model under profit
uncertainty.

(5)

In order to make F(π) has the fixed estimated value
when π is approaching the maximum value, G π β1 must
be zero. In equation (4), π
is the present value of
r–µ
profit obtained if the owner keeps a vessel; D π β2 represents the profit of cycling purchased vessel and must be
positive. In order to determine the lowest value of
constant D and the profit level, we have to consider the
following conditions:
(a) value- matching condition:

(b) smooth-pasting condition:

(4)

where β1 > 0, β2 < 0 are roots of the quadratic equation:

Ω(β) ≡ 1 σ 2β(β – 1) + µβ – r = 0
2
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WTA OF VESSEL OWNERS AND
GOVERNMENT PURCHASING PRICE
In this section, we analyze how government offers
vessel owners a buyback aged vessel program to encourage the retirement of aged vessels under the cycled
period as vessel owners still own their aged vessels. We
use F(b) representing the owner’s expected present
value of profit for giving up an aged vessel, while F(b)
is the owner’s present value of profit and π ∈ [b, ∞).
Therefore, in order to induce vessel owners who have
got the profit up to π ∈ [b, m) to accept the aged vessel
buyback program offered by the government, rather
than waiting for the profit π up to the value of b, the
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price of buyback R must
F(b) = R = F( π ), or
R ≥ F(p) − F(b) ≡ U( π , b)

(8)

In equation (8), U(π, b) is the willingness to accept
(WTA) for the owner to accept the government buyback
program. The WTA is related to the current vessel’s
profit π , the degree of profit uncertainty σ , a new
vessel’s purchasing cost C, the discount rate r, and the
trend value of µ. Through calculation, equation (8) can
be rewritten as

U(π , b) = D(π

β2

–b

β2

)+

1 (π – b)
r–µ

(9)

From equation (9), we can see that when the vessel’s
profit reaches the value of b, U(b, b). At that time, the
fishing vessel owners are sure to give up their aged
vessels without the buyback incentive offered by the
government. As a matter of fact, even if the vessel
owners have not accepted the conditions of the vessel
buyback program, they will make a decision to buy a
new vessel. On the other hand, if the fishing craft is new
or the external factors such as smuggling activities or
selling the fishing vessel oil illegally is alternative, this
will cause the profit to be π = m, and then U(m, b) = C.
In addition, we can see that when σ → 0, that is, the
fishing vessel’s profit is under certainty , the WTA can
be rewritten as follows:

U σ → 0(π , b *) =

1 (π – b *)
r–µ

(10)

and
Uσ → 0(b*, b*) = 0 and U σ → 0(m, b*) = C

(11)

According to equations (9) to (11), we obtain the
following results:
(1) Under profit uncertainty, the vessel owners will not
participate in the vessel buyback program because
U(π, b) > Uσ → 0(p, b*), which induces their willingness to replace new vessels in a slow pace so that the
aged vessel buyback program funded by the government is hard to achieve the expected effects.
(2) The buyback price of aged vessel funded by the
government should be between [0, C]. We are sure
that the price is related to the net profit level π t for
ship owners in the time period of t.
NUMERICAL SIMULATION
For the purpose of analyzing how the profit uncertainty affect the WTA, we set up three uncertainty

parameters σ = 0 (i.e., profit is certain), σ = 1 and σ =
10; r = 0.05, µ = −0.5, C = 100,000. By using equations
(5), (6) and (7), we can get value of β2, D and b. Finally,
substituting these values into equation (9), we obtain
the equations (12), (13) and (14) as follows.
(i). when σ = 0, we have β 2 = −1,
D ≈ 74,967,890,560, b ≈ 86,584

(12)

U( π , 86584) = 74967890560( π −1 − 86584 −1)
+ 10( π − 86584)
(ii). when σ = 1, we have β 2 = −0.0844,
D ≈ 25,345,114, b ≈ 82,296
U( π , 82296) = 25345114( π − 0.0844 − 86584
− 0.0844) + 10( π − 82296)

(13)

(iii). when σ = 1, we have β 2 = −0.001,
D ≈ 825,736,578, b ≈ 81,645.
U( π , 81645) = 825736578( π − 0.001 − 81645
− 0.001) + 10( π − 81645)

(14)

Substituting different profits of a vessel to equations (12), (13) and (14), we obtain the results as shown
in Figure 3. This figure depicts the fact that shows the
amount of WAT is increasing in£mbecause when the
situation gets worse in profit uncertainty, the waiting
value will be higher than expected. As a result, vessel
owners should be more inclined to slow down their
willingness for participating in the vessel buyback
program. Therefore, the purchased price of aged vessels granted by the government should be increased to
encourage vessel owners to give up their aged vessels
voluntarily.
CONCLUSION
This paper is important because it shows how the
profit uncertainty of vessel owners affects their decision in participating in the vessel buyback program.
Our study suggests that when the government decides to
implement the vessel buyback program, it should pay
more attention to consider the effect of the profit uncertainty faced by vessel owners. For example, the vessel
owner’s profit level is the capability of making a profit
for an aged vessel, which is the residual value of an aged
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U
σ = 1 σ = 10
0
5
0
21
32
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649
471
877 1,095
1,169 1,408
1,402 1,653
2,046 2,320
2,803 3,094
3,673 3,972
4,652 4,951
5,738 6,030
6,928 7,206
8,221 8,478
9,613 9,843
11,103 11,299
12,689 12,845
14,368 14,478
16,139 16,197
17,999 18,000

Fig. 3. Impact on uncertain factors to WTA.

vessel. Therefore, the buyback price granted by the
government should match the vessel owner’s WTA.
Otherwise the rate of participation in the program will
be overestimated.
In addition to the profit uncertainty for vessel
owners, the government should find out what are the
reasons that cause this kind of uncertainty. If the
government can restore steady profitability to vessel
owners, there will be more incentives for those with
lower waiting value to participate in the vessel buyback
program. The intuition is that under the profit uncertainty faced by the fisheries industry, the first thing for
the government to do is to stabilize the vessel owners’
profit. If this is achievable, then the expected goals of
the vessel buyback programs can be effectively reached.
However, our data shows that the fisheries resources of
offshore and coastal fisheries are steadily decreasing
due to overfishing. To protect this trend from worsening,
Taiwan’s Fisheries Administration has decided to implement the vessel buyback programs continuously in following years, and to increase the price of purchased
vessels from 40% up to 270%. This confirms our
model’s implications. Moreover, we have been informed that the expense of brought trawl equipments
this year will be subsidized. This implies that the

waiting value has been increased tremendously. It is
suggested that the government has to increase the vessel
buyback price to make vessel owners having higher
incentives to give up their aged vessels.
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